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FRIEDRICHS: AN UNEXPECTED TOOL 
FOR LABOR  
Heather M. Whitney* 
Today, about half of U.S. states allow unions and public-sector 
employers to privately negotiate for agency shop arrangements. Un-
der such an arrangement, employees in a bargaining unit who choose 
to not join the union (and thus do not pay membership dues) are re-
quired to pay a fee to the union that covers their share of the costs the 
union bears as their collective bargaining representative. 1  Unions 
cannot avoid these costs. As is the case under the NLRA for private-
sector unions, states require an exclusive bargaining representative 
regime. That is, if workers want to guarantee that their employer will 
sit down and bargain with their representative, those workers must 
ensure that their chosen representative is not just chosen by them but 
supported by a majority of workers in their bargaining unit – a bar-
gaining unit they do not get to choose for themselves.2 Once their 




* Bigelow Fellow & Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. The author 
wishes to thank Will Baude, Genevieve Lakier, and Laura Weinrib. 
1 See, e.g., Jurupa Unified School District and National Education Association – Ju-
rupa, Collective Bargaining Agreement at section 6 (July 1, 2014) (Membership/Ser-
vice Fees provision) (the CBA at issue in Friedrichs).  
2 For public teachers in California this is mandated under the Education Employ-
ment Relation Act. Under the Act, public school teachers have the right to “form, join, 




representative is chosen by a majority in that unit, the representative 
is then the exclusive representative for all the unit members, even 
those who do not want that representative bargaining on their behalf. 
Because the union represents all members of the bargaining unit, the 
law also requires the union to represent all members equally. The 
union cannot, for instance, bargain for a raise for union members 
only. If the union extracts additional benefits from the employer on 
behalf of workers, both union members and non-members must 
share in those gains equally.3 
As a result of government-imposed exclusive representation and 
fair representation requirements, the government has created its own 
free rider problem. Once the union has been elected, a worker knows 
she will get any benefits the union can provide without ever having 
to join, and thus pay membership dues to, that union. Agency fees 
(also known as “fair share” fees) are intended to combat this prob-
lem. By requiring non-members of the bargaining unit to pay their 
share of the costs, some free riding is avoided.  
Despite the importance of agency fees to avoiding the problem 
of the free rider, this Court may soon find that the agency fee system 
violates the First Amendment rights of the workers required to pay 
them. The Supreme Court previously considered and rejected this ar-
gument in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
There, the Court held that requiring non-members to pay the union 
for the costs it incurred for collective bargaining and contract admin-
istration did not violate the First Amendment, though requiring non-




and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their choosing for the 
purpose of representation on all matters of employer-employee relations.” Cal. Gov’t 
Code § 3543(a). Exclusive representation is required under § 3544-3544.9.  
3 This includes arbitration over statutory rights. See Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 
U.S. 247, 271 (2009) (finding duty extended to arbitrating age discrimination claims 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) when the collective 
bargaining agreement required arbitration of those claims).  




members to pay for the union’s political activities would. In Friedrichs 
v. California Teachers Association, the Court will squarely address 
whether it should overturn Abood. The argument is that the distinc-
tion Abood drew between political and non-political union speech is 
an impossible one, as all union speech in the public-sector context is 
political and thus all compelled funding is unconstitutional.  The 
Court will also decide whether an opt-in system of dues payments is 
constitutionally required. Betting on what the Court will do is a dan-
gerous game but, at least prior to Justice Scalia’s unexpected death, 
it seemed likely, given language in other recent cases, that Abood 
would be overturned and public-sector employers will no longer be 
free to negotiate agency shop arrangements with their workers’ un-
ions.4 Now, though, the outcome is even less certain, though it seems 
plausible the Court will split 4-4 and Abood will live to see another 
day.  
There are a lot of issues that have to be dealt with in Friedrichs – 
why and when compelled funding compelled speech and whether 
the fact that the government is acting as an employer will come to 
bear on the Court’s First Amendment analysis being just two of them. 
These are important questions that many scholars will cover in the 
lead-up to this case. I will not add to the pile. Instead, here I want to 
think about this case from a different perspective. That is, if the Court 
were to overturn Abood, now or in the future, what that means for 
unions and the future of labor more generally. There are three ques-
tions I want to focus on: first, does the government-created free rider 
problem, where unions are required to provide free services to non-
members, create a takings issue? I think under current precedent the 
answer is no. Second, if it violates the First Amendment to require 




4 See Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 
(2012); see also Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (refusing to apply Abood to 
“quasi” public sector workers and thus finding the agency shop arrangement to vio-
late the First Amendment).  




non-members to pay agency fees, does the entire exclusive bargain-
ing regime and corresponding duty of fair representation violate the 
First Amendment rights of unions? I think there are reasons to believe 
it does. And last, what effect will Friedrichs and its progeny have on 
the future of labor organization? Here I suggest that while it is possi-
ble these cases will “kill” labor, there is another story that is possible 
and indeed supported by history and current events: a backlash 
against union repression resulting in the mobilization of labor. No 
longer finding the NLRA and state-equivalent bargain worth the 
price, workers may decide it better to fight outside that system. Be-
low I take each of these questions in turn.  
TAKINGS FROM UNIONS  
Does requiring the union to provide services to non-paying non-
members constitute a taking, at least when doing so requires the un-
ion to expend money? If you take the position that “all regulations, 
all taxes, and all modifications of liability rules [should be understood 
as] takings of private property prima facie compensable by the state” 
the answer is easy: yes.5 Conversely, if you are an originalist and be-
lieve the Takings Clause was narrowly meant to require compensa-
tion when the government exercises its power of eminent domain – 
that is, when the government physically seized property – the answer 
is also easy: no.6 But if what we are asking is whether there is a col-
orable argument that requiring exclusive representation that non-
members do not have to pay for constitutes a takings given current 
case law, the answer is complicated. The Court’s takings jurispru-
dence is a conceptual mess.7 Given that, while there are some cases 




5 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985).  
6 For this view see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Tak-
ings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 840 (1995).   
7 See id. at 782 n.6 (listing other scholars who have taken this view).    




that support such a conclusion, those cases stand on unstable concep-
tual grounds.8   
That the prohibition on agency fees could constitute a taking 
when combined with the duty of fair representation appears to have 
been first suggested by Chief Judge Wood, in her dissent in Sweeney 
v. Pence.9 There, the Seventh Circuit had to decide whether Indiana’s 
“right to work” law was preempted by federal labor legislation and, 
even if it was not preempted, whether it violated the First Amend-
ment rights of unions.10 As Chief Judge Wood saw it, the duty of fair 
representation in conjunction with the Indiana statute, which prohib-
ited the employer and union from negotiating any contract that re-
quired non-members to pay money to the union to cover their share 
of the costs,11 meant the state took the union’s money by requiring 
the union to expend money to provide services to non-members. 
Judge Wood found this scheme to look like the one struck down in 
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington.12 There, a state required in-
terest income that was generated by clients’ funds held in lawyers’ 
trust accounts to be transferred from the account to a foundation that 
provided legal services to the poor. The Court held in Brown that the 
interest was the property of the clients and if the government was 
going to require it to be transferred from the account to the founda-
tion, that action had to be justified under the Takings Clause.13 Brown 
involved the government explicitly required a transfer of money 
from one private party to another while the Indiana statute required 
unions to provide services but was agnostic about which money (if 




8 This is a change from my prior position. See, e.g., Heather Whitney, When Does 
Labor Law Violate the Takings Clause, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 2, 2015); see also Heather Whit-
ney, Guest Post: The Takings Clause and Sweeney v. Pence, ONLABOR (Sep. 4, 2014).  
9 Full disclosure: I clerked for Chief Judge Wood.  
10 Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014).  
11 See Ind. Code § 22-6-6.  
12 538 U.S. 216 (2003).  
13 See id. at 235.  




any) had to be spent to provide them, that distinction was thought 
irrelevant for purposes of a takings analysis by both the majority and 
dissent. For its part, the majority found that to the extent there was a 
taking, the union was justly compensated for it through its continued 
exclusive bargaining representative power.14 
While the majority’s response is unconvincing,15 there is another 
difficulty with finding a taking and it happens at the threshold. What 
private property does the government take when it requires a private 
party to provide services to another?16 In this case, it appears to be 
the money a particular union would have to spend to provide the 
requisite services. But the argument that whenever the government 




14 Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 21. 
15 For one, this argument looks much like the one rejected in Loretto. There the Court 
said that “a landlord’s ability to rent his property may not be conditioned on his for-
feiting the right to compensation for a physical occupation.” 458 U.S. at 439 n.17. The 
Court went on to say that such an argument “would allow the government to require 
a landlord to devote a substantial portion of his building to vending and washing ma-
chines, with all profits to be retained by the owners of these services and with no com-
pensation for the deprivation of space. It would even allow the government to requi-
sition a certain number of apartments as permanent government offices.” Id. The ma-
jority’s argument is similar. A union could avoid the requirement by ceasing to be the 
bargaining representative of the workers who exercised their federal and state rights 
to be represented by one just as a landlord could refuse the requirement by ceasing to 
be a landlord, but being a landlord and being a bargaining representative may not be 
so conditioned. See id. at 439 n.17. Moreover, as the Court most recently reaffirmed in 
Horne, its “cases have set forth a clear and administrable rule for just compensation: 
‘The Court has repeatedly held that just compensation normally is to be measured by 
‘the market value of the property at the time of the taking.’” Horne v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015) (citing United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 
24, 29 (1984) (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)). The compensa-
tion is the market value of the property (here, money) the government took, not a hazy 
theory that the mandated exclusive representation regime is a form of compensation 
for another mandate the union did had little choice but to accept.  
16 As scholars have noted, this threshold requirement is too often assumed. See 
Thomas Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 891 n.20 
(collecting scholarship criticizing the Court and scholars for overlooking this ques-
tion). It is an assumption I have been guilty of in prior writings on this topic. See supra 
note 8. 




requires someone to provide a benefit to another the Takings Clause 
applies was rejected by a majority of the Justices in Eastern Enterprises 
v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). There, a statute enacted in 1992 required 
companies that used to be in coal mining business to contribute to a 
fund providing for the health-related expenses of retired miners and 
their families. The statute required Eastern Enterprises to pay for 
such benefits for miners it employed between 1946 and 1965, even 
though it never agreed to provide those benefits in the original col-
lective bargaining agreements. The expected liability created by the 
statute was between $50 and $100 million. While the parties did not 
raise the issue, nor did the Justices at oral arguments, the Justices 
were split on whether the Coal Act took any property within the 
meaning of the Takings Clause at all. In total, five justices found that 
it did not.17 As Justice Kennedy put it, “[t]he law simply imposes an 
obligation to perform an act, the payment of benefits. The statute is 
indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to comply or the 
property it uses to do so . . . To call this sort of governmental action 
a taking as a matter of constitutional interpretation is both imprecise 
and . . . unwise.”18 Indeed, the Court had previously rejected the ar-
gument that a takings occurs “whenever legislation requires one per-
son to use his or her assets for the benefit of another.”19  
While the line between a taking and regulation is already “diffi-
cult to discern or to maintain,” extending the regulatory takings doc-
trine to situations like this one, where the duty merely requires the 
union to perform a service, and where no specific property right or 




17 While there were five votes to find the Act unconstitutional, four did so as a tak-
ings and the fifth vote, by Justice Kennedy, found the act a violation of substantive 
due process while expressly finding the Act did not take property within the meaning 
of the Takings Clause.  
18 Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998).  
19 Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 555–556 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (quoting Connoll v. Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)).  




interest is at stake, arguably takes what is already “one of the most 
difficult and litigated areas of the law” and makes it more so.20 This 
is not to say that the requirement that unions provide free services to 
non-members is not a burden, but if the line between takings on one 
side and permissible taxes and regulations on the other is to be main-
tained, finding a takings is more trouble than it is worth.  
COMPELLED SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION BY UNIONS  
The next question worth considering in a post-Friedrichs world is 
whether, if compelling non-members to pay agency fees to public 
sector unions violates the First Amendment, union’s First Amend-
ment rights are infringed by both the exclusive bargaining regime 
and corresponding duty of fair representation.  
If the Court overturns Abood, it will likely do so by rejecting the 
distinction Abood made between a union’s non-political and political 
speech and instead find all public sector union speech to be politi-
cal.21 Once collective bargaining-related speech is considered politi-
cal, requiring unions to engage in that speech on behalf of non-mem-
bers (by imposing on them the duty of exclusive representation) 
should also be considered compelled political speech and compelled 




20 Id. at 540, 542.  
21 Of course, the Court could go the other way. That is, it could take the position 
that compelled funding raises no First Amendment issues at all, even with the union 
speaking politically. Like in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic Institutional Rights, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006), the Court could find that agency fees do not involve compelled 
speech because the non-members are not required to say anything and remain “free 
… to express whatever views they may have on the [union’s collective bargaining ac-
tivities].” Id. at 60. Or the Court could find the compelled funding “ancillary to a more 
comprehensive program restricting [labor relations] autonomy” and thus acceptable. 
See United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 406 (2001) (distinguishing Glickman, 
where mandatory assessments to promote tree fruit were upheld against a First 
Amendment challenge). I do not mean to suggest the Court could not come to such a 
conclusion. However, here I mean to imagine a post-Friedrichs world where plaintiffs 
win.  




expressive association. The same is true of the requirement that they 
provide services to non-members (the duty of fair representation).  
Start with the duty of fair representation. As mentioned previ-
ously, the duty arises from the union’s role as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative and requires the union to represent all employees 
within the unit “without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, 
and in good faith.”22 The duty applies at all stages of collective bar-
gaining, from negotiations to contract enforcement. Between requir-
ing the union to represent and bargain on behalf of non-members, 
prohibiting it to favor its own members, and requiring equal treat-
ment through contract enforcement, the law compels unions to speak 
and negotiate with certain individuals. Post-Friedrichs that is com-
pelled political speech and association.23   
To overcome this infringement on the union’s First Amendment 
rights, other scholars have argued that the government must demon-
strate that it has a “compelling interest in requiring unions to negoti-
ate and grieve their nonmembers’ complaints without receiving just 
compensation and that this duty [is] narrowly tailored to effectuate 
that interest.”24 But that is the wrong question for two reasons. First, 




22 Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (under the Railway Labor 
Act). The duty was extended to unions operating under the auspices of the National 
Labor Relations Act in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman. California mandated the duty via 
statute. See e.g., California Educational Employment Relations Act, Government Code 
section 3544.9; Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act section 3578. Cal-
ifornia adopted the federal test for determining whether a union violated the duty of 
fair representation in Romero v. Rocklin Teachers Association (1980). A union violates 
this duty if it acts in an “arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith” manner. See Vaca v. 
Snipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). 
23 Indeed, Harris, where the Court held that the agency fee arrangement for quasi 
public sector workers violated the First Amendment already found that bargaining is 
political speech in the public-sector context.  See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).  
24 Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions 
of Compelled Speech, 48 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 439, 488 (2014). 




whether the union is reimbursed for the compelled speech and asso-
ciation the government requires it to take on may be relevant to 
whether the system exacts as taking from the union but is irrelevant 
to whether the government has a compelling interest in compelling 
that speech and association in the first instance. We do not think the 
problem in Barnette, where school children were unconstitutionally 
compelled to salute the American flag, was that the government re-
quired that salute without paying the students, nor do we think the 
problem would have been different if payment were involved; the 
issue was whether the government had a compelling interest in forc-
ing the students to salute. In the exclusive representation context, the 
government compels the union to speak on behalf of non-members 
and to speak for them equally as much as the union speaks for its 
own members. Post-Friedrichs, this set-up compels the union to speak 
and associate politically. Thus, in order to overcome the First 
Amendment challenge, the government must demonstrate a compel-
ling interest in requiring that exclusive representation regime.  
One might stop here and argue that the government does not 
compel an exclusive bargaining regime. The union could instead op-
erate a “members only” union, and indeed the language of the statute 
at issue in Friedrichs suggests the availability of that option.25 How-
ever, that option is not in fact available to the union. In order for pub-
lic sector workers to exercise their right to have their employer sit 
down and negotiate with the representative of their choosing, that 
representative is required under California law to be the exclusive 
representative of that workers’ bargaining unit. 26 The same is true 
under the NLRA. While the plain language of section 7 guarantees 




25 See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3543.1(a) (“Employee organizations shall have the right to 
represent their members in their employment relations with public school employ-
ers”).  
26 See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3543.   




covered employees “the right to . . . bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing,” the Board has held that employ-
ers are not required to bargain with member-only labor organiza-
tions.27 Thus, in order for workers to guarantee their ability to bar-
gain through representatives of their own choosing, that representa-
tive must represent all members of that worker’s bargaining unit. In 
the same way a non-member of the bargaining unit is “forced” to pay 
agency fees (or find another job), the members and union are 
“forced” to associate with and speak with non-members (or lose their 
statutory right to negotiate through the representative of their choos-
ing). As long as the former constitutes an unconstitutional condi-
tion,28 so too should the latter; their First Amendment challenges 
should rise and fall together.29  




27 See NLRB Advice Memorandum, Dick’s Sporting Goods, Case No. 6-CA-34821 
(June 22, 2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Advice% 
20Memo/RecenfReleases/6-CA-34821(06-22-06).pdf (NLRB General Counsel refused 
to issue a complaint against employer who declined to recognize and bargain with 
member-only union, finding “the employer in these circumstances had no obligation 
to recognize and bargain with the Council. This principle is well-settled and not an 
open issue . . . the statutory obligation to bargain is fundamentally grounded on the 
principle of majority rule.”). See also NLRB Advice Memorandum, Charleston Nursing 
Center, Case No. 11-CA-8753, available at http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/docu-
ment.aspx/09031d45800b2f0b (finding employer did not interfere with employees’ 
section 7 right to bargain collectively when it refused to meet with a group of workers).  
28 And recall in the context of the NLRA, the Court has found the right of employees 
to self-organize and select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargain-
ing or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer a “fun-
damental right.” See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 
1, 33 (1937).  
29 Another parallel worth drawing is between the First Amendment rights giving 
to corporations and unions. If one believes states cannot condition access to incorpo-
ration on the waiver of First Amendment rights, then one should also believe states 
cannot condition the right to negotiate collectively through a chosen representative on 
the waiver of First Amendment rights. While there are interesting arguments for why 
the state should be able to condition access to the corporate form in this way but as-
sume for purposes of this article that the current Supreme Court does not take that 
position.  




The question we are now left with is whether the government, in 
2016, can demonstrate a compelling interest in requiring an exclusive 
representative regime. The Court has previously recognized “that a 
single employee [is] helpless in dealing with an employer; that he [is] 
dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of him-
self and family; that, if the employer refused to pay him the wages 
that he thought fair, he [is] nevertheless unable to leave the employ 
and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union[s] [are] essential 
to give laborers [the] opportunity to deal on an equality with their 
employer.”30 This is the reality for a large share of workers and as the 
Court has said, Congress “[is] not required to ignore” the need for 
collective action given this reality, and can thus “safeguard it.”31 Let 
us then assume that the government has a compelling interest in reg-
ulating the employer-employee relationship in light of the risk of ar-
bitrary and unfair treatment of the much less powerful workers at 
the hands of employers. Promoting and safeguarding worker collec-
tive action is a reasonable way to approach it, but we are still left with 
whether an exclusive bargaining regime is sufficiently tailored to 
promote that interest. And here the argument becomes more diffi-
cult. The government does not require unionization. The default is 
non-unionization and at least one of the aims of the NLRA regime is 
to ensure employees can freely choose to unionize or not.32 Why, if 
workers choose to unionize, must they unionize under an exclusive 
bargaining regime? It is understandable why the state of California 
prefers exclusive representation based on majority rule – dealing with 
a single representative for all workers may be easier than dealing 




30 Jones, 301 U.S. at 33–34. 
31 Id. 
32 See NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946) (explaining that Congress 
requires the Board to establish the rules and “safeguards necessary to insure the fair 
and free choice of bargaining representatives by employees”).  




with many.33 But, first, in the absence of unionization, public-sector 
employers are in the much more burdensome position of negotiating 
individually with each employee. And second, convenience is no re-
sponse to whether exclusive representation is properly tailored to the 
government’s legitimate interest. The government and labor scholars 
must accept the challenge of justifying the imposition of exclusive 
representation where, post-Friedrichs, it compels political speech and 
association. I am doubtful it can be done.  
Instead of scholars defending the government’s compelling in-
terest in having an exclusive bargaining regime, some scholars have 
argued for members-only (also known as minority) unions.34 At least 
one has argued that the NLRA can be read to allow for member only 
unions today.35 In my own work I have highlighted how workers 
have worked together to extract gains totally outside the exclusive 
representation regime.36 While it may be that in a world without ex-
clusive representation workers need additional protections when 
striking, picketing, and engaging in secondary boycotts, all of those 
protections could be given without compelling union and non-mem-
bers political speech and association.  
MOBILIZATION OF LABOR 
So far I have raised and speculated about potential post-Frie-
drichs First and Fifth Amendment issues. I want to end by speculating 




33 See San Mateo City Sch. Dist. v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 663 P.2d 523, 
531 (1983). 
34 Though they have only argued for this in right to work states and do not suggest 
it replace the exclusive bargaining regime elsewhere. See Catherine Fisk & Benjamin I. 
Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right to Work, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 859 (2014).  
35  See CHARLES MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC 
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2005). 
36 See Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on Employer-Labor Organization Coop-
eration, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 101 (2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2663593. 




about the social and political implications of not just overturning 
Abood but of overturning it in an environment where NLRA-style un-
ionization is already difficult to achieve and an increasingly unattrac-
tive option for those interested in furthering the interests of work-
ers.37 Here I suggest that while the dominant story is that Friedrichs 
and its progeny are killing off unions, that story may be wrong. There 
is instead an alternative story and it is one of worker and union back-
lash against courts and business interests they perceive as attacking 
them.38 On this story, Friedrichs and its progeny have unintentionally 
created a focal point – a rallying cry – around which workers and 
unions can mobilize, radicalize, and develop creative and powerful 
alternatives to New Deal-type unionization. Indeed, we may be in 
the early days of that backlash now.     
In her Harris dissent, Justice Kagan rightly pointed out that 
where the law compels the union to represent members and non-
members equally while also prohibiting agency fee arrangements, it 
is in the economic self-interest of both those who support and oppose 
the union to withhold payment. 39  However, while Justice Kagan 
seemed to worry that the absence of short-term economic self-inter-
est would result in the financial ruin of unions, we know that is not 
the case. Today, 25 states already have right-to-work laws and in 




37 Many scholars, myself included, have documented the Board and court-created 
difficulties modern unions face. See, e.g., id.,  DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: 
WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE (2014); Katherine 
Stone, Rethinking Labour Law: Employment Protections for Boundaryless Workers, in 
BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW 155 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 
2006).   
38 Backlash against Court decisions has been documented previously. See Michael 
J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 
(1994). 
39 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 22 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  




those states we have not seen unions fall into financial peril.40 Instead 
the enactment of such laws appears to result in a small drop in union 
membership.41 But given that paying the union in right-to-work ju-
risdictions can be understood as financially irrational, what might 
explain worker support? Justice Kagan thought altruism or loyalty 
the only available alternative explanations,42 but there are others. Un-
ions are among the types of private associations that make up a vi-
brant civil society and make available to individuals a community 
and sense of identity. Joining and supporting a union can be an im-
portant social and political act, particularly in the wake of court de-
cisions that are perceived as an attempt to kill unions. Worker soli-
darity and mutual aid, upon which unions are founded, are after all 
political and social ideals.43 And, while it is too early to say, it may 
well be that as the Court exacerbates the free rider problem unions 
face, unions will look to stoke within workers the embers of a soli-
darity ethos that were neglected so long as access to member money 
did not require activation of such class consciousness.44 Group soli-
darity is in turn an important precondition for the creation of social 




40 See Scott Cohn, An American Workplace War That’s Reached a Tipping Point, CNBC 
(May 29, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/29/the-right-to-work-battle-has-
reached-a-tipping-point.html.  
41 Here I am referring to drops in membership among bargaining units already or-
ganized prior to the enactment of the right to work law. Bureau of Labor Statistics data 
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movement organization, like labor organizations, and social move-
ment activism more generally.45 
Public sector unions’ preemptive response to Friedrichs suggests 
such stoking has begun. Not intending to sit passively by and await 
their demise, the possible elimination of agency fees has mobilized 
the organizations. The president of AFSCME said in a recent inter-
view that agency fee arrangements had made the teachers’ union 
complacent. “I think we took things for granted. We stopped com-
municating with people, because we didn’t feel like we needed to. 
That was the wrong approach, and we don’t want to fall back in to 
that trap.”46 In anticipation of Friedrichs the union has taken steps to 
remedy that error, creating a more engaged membership – a mem-
bership that feels invested in and solidarity with the union and its 
leadership. 47  Other union leaders have expressed similar senti-
ments.48   
Workers and union mobilization in response to a judiciary it 
thinks illegitimate would not be a historical anomaly. In the early 
twentieth century, something similar happened and labor went out-
side the formal channels of politics and litigation and instead acted 
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Movement New Life, WASH. POST (July 1, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/07/01/the-supreme-courts-threat-to-gut-un-
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47 See id. 
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WASH. POST (July 1, 2014), https://www.washing-
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workers-as-it-sounds/ (quoting Gay Casteel, the Southern region director of the 
United Auto Workers, who said: “This is something I’ve never understood, that peo-
ple think right to work hurts unions. To me, it helps them”).  




directly, through mass protests, strikes, and boycotts.49 Today, we 
see workers doing something not dissimilar, though admittedly so 
far on a much smaller scale. Recognizing that the benefits of massive 
government regulation is no longer worth the costs, workers are de-
veloping non-traditional forms of worker organizations that entirely 
bypass the NLRA and its state equivalents. “Fight for $15,” a move-
ment backed heavily by the SEIU to raise the minimum wage for fast 
food workers to $15 an hour, is one particularly successful version of 
this. The Immokalee Workers, who work to better conditions of to-
mato pickers in Florida by targeting reputation-sensitive companies 
like Taco Bell and national grocery stores at the top of the food sup-
ply chain (instead of their direct employers) are another.50 For these 
non-traditional organizations, Friedrichs does nothing to slow their 
momentum.   
In short, while Friedrichs may well overturn Abood and with it a 
compromise that has lasted for decades, between the First Amend-
ment arguments it makes available to unions and the backlash that is 
already brewing in response to it and the conditions in which work-
ers currently find themselves, I suspect the case will ultimately be to 
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ionization see Whitney, supra note 36.  
